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Abstract: 
 
The paper traces the causal links of Indo-Pakistan conflict with trade, military 
expenditure and democracy under multivariate time series framework from 1950-
2005. We find that higher exports to outside world and increased bilateral trade have 
high propensity to reduce hostilities between both nations. Furthermore, historically 
high military expenditures in Pakistan have been a direct outcome of continued 
hostilities in its Eastern borders whereas Indian military expenditure is weakly related 
with the conflict. Political orientation of both countries does not seem to significantly 
affect the conflict either. Overall, the findings support the case for liberal (economic) 
peace than political (democratic) peace.  
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‘The destinies of our two nations are interlinked. We need to put the past behind us’ (Indian 
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in response to Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf’s peace 
initiatives) The Nation, December 21, 2006 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Conflict may be motivated by factors such as historical grievances, 
the clash of civilizations (Huntingdon, 1996), or pure avarice. 
Outright hostility between states implies the absence of peaceful 
cooperation that can manifest itself in diminished inter-state 
commerce, which in turn could further exacerbate the rivalry 
between the same countries. In this paper we are concerned with 
inter-state rivalry between India and Pakistan, and not civil war. 
Civil war is the most dominant form of war at present, see Harbom 
and Wallensteen (2005) for data, and it is also a major obstacle 
preventing growth and poverty reduction (Murshed, 2002, 2006) in 
low-income developing countries. Despite the preponderance of civil 
war, inter-state rivalry has not entirely withered away, and these 
too can also divert substantial amounts of resources away from 
poverty reduction. Often, inter-state conflict is associated with 
forms of belligerency short of open armed warfare, as was common 
during the cold war. Such threats can be associated with the 
maintenance of large standing armies menacing each other, even 
when they do not openly fight. Other forms of aggressive behaviour 
between countries include trade restrictions, accusations that rival 
states sponsor terrorism, expelling diplomats and so on. India, 
Pakistan relations are a prime example of this form of inter-state 
rivalry. It has also been plausibly suggested that neighbours may be 
more belligerent towards one another compared to more distant 
pairs of nations. Geographically contiguous countries have both 
more to gain from cooperation, as well as greater temptations to fall 
into conflict (Chang, Polachek and Robst, 2004).  
 
International trade allows one country to non-violently benefit from 
the endowments of another nation through peaceful exchange. Free 
trade expands the consumption and production set of nations 
engaged in international trade. Above all, trade is an important 
engine of economic growth, and by implication poverty reduction, 
even if it in certain cases exacerbates existing income inequalities.3  
Furthermore, free trade integrates the world economy into an 
economy resembling that of one nation state. These are the 
standard text book gains from trade.4  
                                                 
3 We are not discussing unequal or colonial types of disadvantaging international 
trade as envisaged by Hobson (1903) or Lenin (1905).  
4 It is very common in the anti-globalisation movement to emphasise the 
immiserising effects of greater international trade. Globalisation can increase the 
disparity between rich and poor nations, despite the fact that the latter group 
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An equally viable manner, however, of earning a living is through 
violence, see Skaperdas (1992). War is a way of expropriating the 
endowments of another country, but it is costly as it destroys part 
of both countries pre-existing wealth. In making a living, predation 
is an alternative to production, but it is not usually the most 
efficient, as predation (war or other forms of larceny) unnecessarily 
wastes resources. Such, unenlightened behaviour may be rational 
or optimal from the standpoint of the individual person or a nation, 
but is inefficient in the global sense. The work of Francis Edgeworth, 
writing in the late 19th century, provides a useful starting point in 
understanding the economic rationale for violence. Edgeworth 
distinguished between consent—and its absence—in human 
economic interaction: 
The first principle of Economics is that every agent is actuated 
only by self-interest. The workings of this principle may be 
viewed under two aspects, according as the agent acts without, 
or with, the consent of others affected by his actions. In wide 
senses, the first species of action may be called war; the second, 
contract. [Edgeworth, 1881, pp 16-17]. 
 
In summary, international economic interactions between nations 
may involve peaceful trade, or it could be belligerent with 
attenuated economic interaction. Outright war is just one 
manifestation of the rivalry between nations; the armed peace is 
equally consistent with aggressiveness. India and Pakistan are a 
case in point. They have had at least four large scale military 
confrontations (1948, 1965, 1971 and 1999), but otherwise spend 
a great deal of time in uncompromising aggressive posturing vis-à-
vis each other. The purpose of this chapter is to explore whether 
greater inter-state trade, democracy and reduced military 
spending lower belligerence between India and Pakistan. The rest 
of this chapter is organised as follows: section 2 states the salient 
stylised facts regarding India-Pakistan interaction, section 3 
contains an outline of our empirical hypotheses and data sources, 
finally section 4 presents our conclusions. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
might benefit from trade via increased economic growth. Furthermore, even when 
growth in the aggregate economy takes place due to increased exports, at a 
disaggregated level there are always winners and losers. And, development non-
governmental organisations often concern themselves with the losers. In a 
situation where growth in aggregate terms has taken place, how gainers may 
compensate losers to produce a truly win-win outcome is a matter of re-
distributive fiscal political economy that is beyond the scope of this work.  
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2 Stylised Facts Regarding India-Pakistan Interactions 
 
Table 1: The Military Burden in Selected Countries  
 
Countries with Conflict 
 
Defence 
Expenditure 
As a % of 
GDP 
 
Countries without conflict 
Defence 
Expenditure 
As a % of 
GDP 
India (2004) 2.34 Canada (2004) 1.19 
Pakistan (2004) 4.14 Germany (2004) 1.38 
Egypt (2004) 2.76 Holland (2004) 1.73 
Syria (2003) 6.97 Sweden  (2004) 1.73 
Israel (2004) 9.30 Argentina (2004) 1.01 
Lebanon (2003) 3.92 Mexico (2004) 0.51 
Saudi Arabia (2004) 7.70 Nicaragua (2004) 0.69 
Oman (2001) 12.16 Panama (2004) 0.97 
Yemen (1999) 5.28 Paraguay (2004) 0.70 
South Korea (2004) 2.45 Peru (2004) 1.20 
USA (2004) 3.98 Guatemala (2004) 0.40 
UK (2004) 2.57 El Salvador (2004) 0.66 
The most recent year for which data is available is given in parenthesis. 
Source: World Development Indicators (2006) 
 
Both countries spend a considerable amount in military 
expenditure, measured as a proportion of GDP (see table 1). In 
fact, they have among the highest military burdens in the world 
outside the Middle East. One can surmise, that such large scale 
military expenditure detracts from development and poverty 
reduction (see also Deger and Sen, 1990) in the region where the 
largest concentration of the world’s poor live (as defined by below 
purchasing power parity $1 a day). There is also a consensus 
which states that sustained high levels of military expenditure as a 
proportion of national income reduce economic growth for 
developing countries. 
 
There are other forms of belligerent behaviour to be considered. 
India, in particular, frequently accuses Pakistan of sponsoring 
terrorism in her territory. But occasionally they make goodwill 
gestures, such as sending out peace buses between cities like 
Delhi and Lahore, and agree to cricket tours.  Less frequently, 
major concessions are made mainly by Pakistan, such as President 
Musharraf’s willingness to put aside the long standing Pakistani 
demand and United Nations resolution for a plebiscite to settle the 
future of Kashmir.5 Figure 1 charts the hostility levels of the two 
states on a scale of 0-6. It has never been below 2, but usually at 
high level of 4, which measures belligerency short of outright war. 
Thus, normal India-Pakistan relations are characterised by 
unusually high hostility levels. 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3330031.stm. 
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1: Pakistan and India Hostility Levels
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Figure 1: Hostility between Pakistan and India 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 No militarised action 
2 Threat to use force 
3 Display of force 
4 Use of force 
5 &6 War 
Source: Faten et al (2004) 
 
Polachek (1997) and Polachek and Seiglie (2006) argue that 
aggressive posturing and other forms of belligerent behaviour 
between states disrupts trade and the costs emerge through a 
deterioration in the terms of trade. Trade between neighbours is 
associated with lower transport costs, and therefore more efficient 
compared to trade with distant partners. Wars and other forms of 
conflict among geographically contiguous states involve greater 
losses, as more efficient geographically proximate trade is 
displaced, Chang, Polachek and Robst (2004). This effect, 
however, depends on the absence of alternative trading partners, 
who despite greater distance may be equally or more efficient. 
Figure 2 shows that India-Pakistan trade (as a proportion of 
Pakistan’s total international trade) steadily declined from nearly 
20% in the early 1950s, plummeting to almost zero after their 
1965 war, and has shown some signs of recovery in the 1990s. We 
concern ourselves with official trade, and not unofficial and illegal 
smuggling activities. The latter is usually a manifestation of 
restrictions on legal trade, and the consumer ends up paying for 
imported goods that are effectively taxed, except that the 
revenues accrue to smuggling entrepreneurs.  
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 Figure 2: Patterns in Pakistan and India Trade  
Source: International Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF) 
 
 
Official trade between India and Pakistan is still below the levels of 
the 1950s, which was shortly after the time two nations were 
separated politically. This is despite the fact that India and 
Pakistan have fairly open economies at present. Traditionally, 
Pakistan has been considerably more open than India (Figure 2, 
panel 3). Pakistan now trades more with developing countries 
compared to developed countries as is shown by graph 4 in figure 
2. In summary, conflict and rivalry are symptomatic of the 
absence of cooperation, including lower trade volumes. Equally, 
conflict may be said to be a consequence of the lack of peaceful 
trade.  
 
A related issue concerns the so-called democratic peace. Put 
simply, the idea is that established democracies do not go to war 
with each other, but cooperate instead because of shared values. 
We will review this and other related concepts more fully in the 
next section. The Polity score of democracy ranges from 0-10, with 
advanced industrialised democracies usually getting 10. Similarly 
there is an autocracy score of between -10 to 0. Together, the 
autocracy and democracy scores gives us an average, acting as an 
indicator of the overall political system, which is graphed above. 
Graph 5 in figure 3 shows that India has one of the highest 
democracy scores in the developing world for the entire 50 year 
period (7-9)6, whereas Pakistan’s experience with democracy is 
more mixed with high autocracy scores at continuous time 
intervals, associated with military coups in 1958, 1969, 1977 and 
                                                 
6 Indeed the only developing countries that compare to India in this respect are 
Colombia, Costa Rica and Mauritius.  
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5. India's Polity 2 score
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1999. Indeed, it can be argued that true democracy implies a 
score of 8 or above. 
 
 
Figure 3: Pakistan-India Conflict, Defence, Development and 
Democracy Trends 
 
Sources: Polity IV Project (Center for International Development and Conflict 
Management) www.cidcm.umd.edu/insr/polity, Pakistan and India Economic 
Survey and Education Statistics 2006 (World Bank) 
 
 
Comparisons of graphs 2 and 3 in figure 3 indicates that military 
expenditures tend to move inversely with development (education) 
expenditure, providing prima facie evidence that large military 
expenditure crowds out development in the social sector. 
Pakistan’s military expenditure is consistently above India’s except 
in the mid-1960s when India had wars with both China and 
Pakistan. In Pakistan’s case, military expenditure as a proportion 
of GDP has historically been at 5%, but rising during and after its 
1965 and 1971 wars with India to as high as 8%. The average 
defence expenditure of Pakistan is 5.5% of GDP in the 1950-2005 
period, whereas for India it is about half at 2.8% of GDP. Since the 
1990s Pakistan’s military expenditure has been falling, and is now 
at a little above 4% of GDP, which represents a historical low. As 
Indian education expenditure rose to 4 % of GDP in the1990s, its 
defence expenditure fell from nearly 4% of GDP in the mid-1960s 
to less than 3% (it has rarely been below 2% of GDP). Pakistan’s 
education public expenditure is stagnating at around 2% of GDP. 
 
The opportunity costs of conflict rise, when countries move to 
higher stages of economic development (see Murshed, 2006), as 
they have more to lose from conflict, and have more resources to 
negotiate peaceful settlements. The 1990s is considered to be a 
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golden decade for India as GDP growth rates reached a high of 
8%, while on average Indian economy grew at 5 to 6% annually, 
along with a significant decline in poverty. Pakistan has been 
growing at an average of 6% for the last 3 to 4 years. 
Traditionally, from the early 1960s up to the early 1990s, 
Pakistan’s was the faster growing economy of the two.  But India 
is currently growing faster, and it also did so in the 1950s. Both 
countries are on track to meet the millennium development goals 
with regard to poverty, and both nations are in the second most 
rapidly growing region in the world (South Asia, see World 
Development Indicators, 2006). 
 
There is more to India Pakistan conflict than merely Pakistan’s 
political orientation and a comparison of bilateral economic growth 
rates. This is because of the fact that despite high growth rates 
and relatively high democracy scores in Pakistan up to 1999, 
conflict between the countries escalated in the 1990s. 
Furthermore, the current regime in Pakistan with a strong military 
orientation (the military is highly influential and the President 
continues to be the army chief), and therefore less democratic, is 
making major unilateral concessions to India vis-à-vis their long 
standing disputes over Kashmir. Could that be related to the very 
recent impressive growth record in Pakistan?  If anything, conflict 
between the two nations can be best understood in a multivariate 
framework where the relevant variables and processes (economic 
performance, integration with rest of the world, trade between the 
conflicting nations, military expenditure, population) are 
simultaneously taken into account. We aim to investigate the 
causal links between bilateral conflict and most of these variables 
in a time series framework, between 1950 and 2005 in most cases.    
 
3 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Hypotheses: 
 
H1: Greater inter-state commerce lowers various forms of inter-
state conflict. 
H2: More military spending raises conflict. More relative military 
expenditure by the regional hegemonic power may lower conflict, as 
the hegemon may have internal conflict and other neighbours to 
militarily confront.  
H3: Development expenditure (such as public spending on 
education) should lower conflict. 
H4: GDP growth will decrease inter-state conflict. 
H5: Increases in dyadic democracy scores will lead to less conflict. 
Increased democracy may lower the cost of concessions and 
compromise with former enemies. 
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Our first hypothesis relates to the concept of the ‘liberal’ peace. A 
lower degree of economic inter-dependence, reflected in small trade 
values as a proportion of total trade will be reflected in greater 
inter-state belligerence. We may also utilise a metric of total 
openness, which measures a country’s dependence on foreign trade 
to gauge the conflict reducing properties of international trade, 
more generally. Secondly, increased military expenditure, which 
detracts from spending on development, is likely to increase 
confrontation and conflict. Note, that we measure conflict not just 
via outright war, but also include other forms of hostile behaviour. 
But the regional super-power, India, may have a large number of 
civil wars to cope with, as well as disputes with other countries. 
India has had a significant number of domestic civil wars7, and in 
the past has had a war with China, intervened in Sri Lanka and so 
on. Thirdly, development expenditure (say on education) is likely to 
lower conflict, because it implies lesser military spending, and 
increased income through economic growth in the future which 
increases the utility of citizens via increased consumption. It also 
lowers poverty. Fourthly, increased per-capita income reduces 
conflict as people have more to lose from the destructiveness of war 
or confrontation (there is less poverty) and more to gain from 
trade: see Lipset’s (1960) hypotheses about the modernising and 
beneficial effects of economic growth on democratic development 
and peace. Higher growth also makes granting concessions to rivals 
less costly, as there are more resources going around, which may 
help to buy-off the disaffected. Finally, we postulate that increased 
dyadic democracy (in this case Pakistan’s, as India is a stable 
democracy) lowers conflict because of the theories of the 
democratic peace, as well as the possibility that higher democracy 
may also lower the political costs of making concessions to rivals, as 
states are more democratically mandated and less answerable to 
special interest groups, including the military.       
The literature on inter-state conflict classifies conflict data sets into 
two categories: 1) war data and 2) events data (Polachek and 
Seiglie, 2006). War data sets focus on more hostile aspects of inter-
state interactions such as crises, wars or militarized inter-state 
disputes (Jones, Bremer and Singer, 1996).  The most 
comprehensive wars data set is available under Correlates of War 
Project (COW) which has updated war data sets employed by 
Wright (1942), Richardson (1960), and Singer and Small (1972). 
The data set covers all major militarized inter-state disputes in 
which one or more states threaten, display, or use force against one 
                                                 
7 According to http://www.prio.no/cwp/ArmedConflict, the Uppsala-PRIO 
database on armed conflict India has had the second highest number of civil wars 
following Burma since 1960.  
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or more other states between 1816 and 2001. The data provides 
coded information on fatality levels, hostility levels, duration of the 
conflict, highest action taken by state in the dispute.  
The other major data set on inter-state armed conflict is hosted by 
the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP) with the collaboration of 
the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) and is 
collected on an annual basis and covers the full post-World War II 
period, 1946–2003. The data set provides coded information on the 
intensity level of the conflict. There are two different intensity 
levels: 1) minor armed conflict and 2) wars. The PRIO data set 
provides information on annual battle deaths. The battle deaths 
data set is available for use with the Correlates of Wars in the 
period 1900–97. UCDP also provides information on precise battle 
deaths in inter-state armed conflicts for 2002-05.  
Events data focuses on all inter-state events and bilateral 
interactions reported in newspapers. McClelland’s (1978) World 
Events Interaction Survey (WIES) is probably the first of its kind 
based on bilateral interactions, occurring between 1966-1992 and 
reported in the New York Times. The WEIS data set codes every 
reported event into 22 broad categories ranging from extending aid 
to military assaults using force. Azar’s (1980) Conflict and Peace 
Data Bank (COPDAB) is an extensive longitudinal collection of about 
one million daily events reported from forty seven newspaper 
sources between 1948-1978. The data set codes events into 15 
broader categories representing different kinds of conflict and 
cooperation. Categories 1 (voluntary unification) through 7 (minor 
official exchanges) represent cooperation and categories 9 (mild 
verbal expressions displaying discord) through 15 (extensive war 
acts causing deaths) represent conflict. Then there is Virtual 
Research Associates (VRA) data set which is derived from dyadic 
events reported in wire services and covers inter-state interactions 
from 1990-2001 (Polachek and Seiglie, 2006).  
Since we are interested in the evolution of India-Pakistan conflict 
over a period of the last 55 years, we will use Uppsala/PRIO and 
COW inter-state war data set instead of events based data sets 
because the former data sets provide conflict data which covers 
most of the period of 55 years (1950-2005) which we have selected 
for our analysis. The events data set is not available for longer 
period of times, and thus may not provide information on the 
evolution of conflict in a longer term. Though the events data set 
captures daily observations, our macroeconomic and democracy 
data varies annually which limits the use of daily information on 
conflict. Secondly, as shown in figure 1, hostility between India and 
Pakistan has usually been high in most of last 55 years, enabling 
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the COW data set to capture the severity of conflict in most years of 
the dispute. Consistently high hostility levels between the two 
countries, the greater coverage by COW and Uppsala data sets, and 
the availability of macroeconomic and democracy data on an annual 
basis limits the scope of using the events data sets.  
Generally dyadic trade is captured by sum of imports and exports 
between actor and target countries (Polachek and Seglie, 2006).  
Figure 2 shows that in the last 55 years the patterns of inter-state 
trade between Pakistan and India have changed. Before trade 
between both countries collapsed to near zero in early 1970s, 
Pakistan was exporting more to India. Since the 1970s, Pakistan is 
importing more from its neighbour. In the 1950s, Pakistan and 
India’s trade with each other constituted a significant amount of 
their respective total trade.  However, after the 1965 war, India-
Pakistan trade never reached more than 2 percent of their 
respective total trade levels. Till the late 1980s, India had been a 
relatively closed economy, whereas Pakistan has traditionally been 
more open. To capture the evolution of international integration in 
both countries, we will not only use Pakistan’s trade with India as 
percentage of Pakistan’s total trade (tpitp) but also India’s trade 
with Pakistan as a percentage of India’s total trade (tpiti). If trade 
reduces conflict, trade among more countries should reduce conflict 
even more (Dorussen, 1999). India and Pakistan are active trading 
nations. It will be interesting to see how more trade with the rest of 
the world affects the India-Pakistan dispute. We construct 4 dyadic 
proxies to capture combined integration level for both countries. 
Pakistan’s total trade as a ratio of India’s total trade and India’s 
total trade as a ratio of Pakistan’s total trade are the first two 
indicators. Since exports are more growth enhancing and thus more 
effective for conflict mitigation than imports, we differentiate 
between exports and imports by taking both countries’ total exports 
as a percentage of the sum of their GDPs, as well as total imports 
separately as a percentage of the sum of their GDPs.  
Military expenditures can reflect hostility, as well as deterrence 
(Polacheck and Seglie, 2006).  In the Pakistan-India case, we would 
like to examine how each county’s military expenditure/ military 
burden affects the dispute. Figure 3 shows that Pakistan’s spending 
on military expenditure as a proportion of GDP is higher than 
India’s. Additionally, since military expenditures may also capture 
the capability of a country to deal with civil unrest or intra-state 
conflict, Indian military expenditure can also be explained in terms 
of the high prevalence of continuing intra-state conflicts in various 
regions of India. Pakistan has had fewer civil wars. This may mean 
that Pakistan’s military burden captures its security concerns vis-à-
vis India solely. If so, dyadic variables which take the military 
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burden of Pakistan as a ratio of the Indian military burden, should 
affect conflict positively and vice versa. We construct 7 different 
proxies of military burden utilizing data on military expenditures as 
well as military personnel from Correlates of Wars. 
The conflict literature suggests that politically similar regime types 
share peace (Oneal and Russet, 1999; Henderson, 2002 to cite only 
two examples). Secondly more democratization leads to more peace 
as democracies are less prone to fight with each other (Polachek 
and Seglie, 2006).  There are two notions of peace between nations 
in international relations or international politics theory that go 
beyond the traditional peace with collective security: the democratic 
peace and the liberal peace. The first reflects the wave of ostensible 
democratization that swept through the world following the end of 
the cold war in 1991; the second argument has economic 
globalization, and the increased interdependence between states, as 
its empirical basis. It is useful to remind ourselves of the 
conventional international relations theory regarding relations 
between states. Nations are meant to exist in a state of anarchy 
vis-à-vis each other, where economic and military power are the 
two levers exercised in their interaction. This means might is right, 
and unlike in domestic politics there is no role for values. Peace can 
prevail providing mechanisms exist to ensure collective security.  
Since the end of the cold war, however, there has been the growth 
of the notion of the democratic peace, roughly implying that nations 
that share common values will not go to war with each other. The 
intellectual basis for this argument has been traced back to 
Immanuel Kant’s (1795) work on the Perpetual Peace, where a like 
mindedness referred to as cosmopolitanism would prevent outright 
war between republics8; a tendency that could be reinforced by 
commercial interdependence (Gelpi and Grieco, 2003). Mirroring 
Kant’s thoughts, the contemporary philosopher, John Rawl’s (1999) 
notion of peace between liberal societies or nations is another form 
of the democratic peace; see Milanovic and Wenar (2007). Rawls 
(1999) argues that liberal societies do not go to war with each other 
because their needs are satisfied, they are non-acquisitive in the 
sense of not wishing to grow beyond an achieved steady-state level 
of (presumably high) income9, and they are tolerant of difference. 
They will only fight in self-defence, and invade to prevent gross 
human rights abuses such as genocide in other countries. They can, 
                                                 
8 It is unclear whether this means solely democratic government, or democratic 
government characterised by checks and balances, and a separation of powers, 
see Franceschet (2000).    
9 As Milanovic and Wenar (2007) point out even rich societies wish to get more 
affluent; the desire for pecuniary advancement may be ever increasing among 
some; basic wants expand with the invention of new goods and services.  
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however, occasionally be duped into supporting foreign wars, as in 
the case of Vietnam or the presence of weapons of mass destruction 
in Iraq. Imperfect liberal societies and democracies may also go to 
war, because it is in the interests of the elite.   
 
Theories of the liberal peace may be traced back to the Baron de 
Montesquieu’s, Spirit of the Laws (1748), where he states that 
commerce tends to promote peace between nations, mutual self-
interest precludes war; trade also softens attitudes of peoples 
towards each other, making them more tolerant of each other. This 
is the idea behind our first empirical hypothesis. 
 
History, however, is replete with examples of liberal societies and 
democratic nations going to war with other countries. War is one 
way of acquiring the endowments of another country, peaceful trade 
is an alternative. This is precisely what colonial wars were about; 
markets or natural resource endowments in the global South were 
captured by force. Kant (1795), himself spoke of these colonial 
wars, and how they despoiled the invaded. Later, Hobson (1903) 
and Lenin (1905) developed their theories of economic imperialism, 
where armed force played an important part. What may be required 
is a combined theory of the democratic and liberal peace, or the 
notion of the liberal peace augmented by democracy. 
Polachek (1997) makes a case for the liberal peace, arguing that a 
common polity (democracy) is largely immaterial. He presents 
empirical evidence to suggest that advanced democracies 
cooperate, not because of their similar political systems, but due to 
their vast and multiply intersecting economic interdependence. 
Barbieri (1996) demonstrates that the liberal peace based upon the 
pacific effects of economic interdependence may be a chimera. 
Oneal and Russet (1999) and Hegre (2000), however, argue that 
economic interdependence reinforces peace, particularly between 
democracies. Perhaps, we need a theory that embeds democracy 
with economic interdependence. As Milanovic and Wenar (2007) 
state internal democratic political processes are not violent because 
of the complex, dense and repeated interactions between actors. 
The same argument can be applied to the realm of economics. 
When extended to relations between nation states, it means that 
that established democracies that are economically very 
interdependent, as well as very familiar with one another (as in the 
developed world) will not go to war. But democracies may behave 
belligerently with non-democracies, a view also echoed by Gelpi and 
Grieco (2003). Furthermore, democracies may go to war with other 
democracies that are distantly located, culturally disparate and 
considerably poorer. Indeed, Robst, Polachek and Chang (2006) 
present some evidence to suggest that more democratic nations 
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could exhibit some degree of belligerence to less democratic 
countries. Their arguments may apply to India-Pakistan relations, 
as India is consistently more ‘democratic’ compared to Pakistan. 
Also, increased democratic levels can mandate concessions and re-
negotiation with neighbours. Democracies or liberal societies that 
become poor, or fall behind other affluent nations because of the 
lack of growth or systemic changes such as the collapse of socialism 
may become aggressive; see Milanovic and Wenar (2007). What is 
also required for peace in a pair-wise dyadic sense between nations 
is not just democracy and economic interdependence, but also high 
levels of development (see Hegre, 2000), as high income nations 
have most to lose from war with one another. Gelpi and Grieco 
(2003) make the argument that more democratic nations have a 
greater stake in growth (autocracies fearing that growth may 
enhance the power of the potential opposition), and trade openness 
facilitates growth, hence democracies that are more open may be 
more pacific with their neighbours. But, there are plenty of 
examples of dictatorships fostering growth (Indonesia, Singapore). 
Equally, many dictatorships favour open economic policies, and 
many democracies that are protectionist because it is against the 
interests of the majority (who may be poor). These arguments 
suggest that growth, increased economic interaction, as well as 
rising democratization are likely to promote peace between India 
and Pakistan.  
To capture democracy levels for India and Pakistan, we turn to the 
Polity IV project hosted by Center of International Development and 
Conflict Management (CIDCM). Polity IV contains coded annual 
information on regime and authority characteristics for all 
independent states (with a population greater than 500,000) in the 
global state system, and covers the years 1800-2004. The data set 
captures general openness of political institutions by providing 
country level democracy scores ranging 0 to 10, where 0 is the 
lowest value for democracy and 10 the highest. Similarly, autocracy 
measures the general closedness of political institutions ranging 
from 0 to -10. Polity IV also computes a combined polity score by 
subtracting autocracy scores from the democracy scores for the 
corresponding year. The value of this Polity score ranges from -10 
to 10, where -10 denotes the highest autocracy level, and 10 the 
maximum democracy score. We have graphed the Polity score for 
India and Pakistan in figure 3 from 1950 to 2005. Although India 
always takes a high positive value of 7 or above, Pakistan 
frequently takes on negative values. We construct a dyadic variable 
of democracy for both countries by combining multiplying their 
Polity scores, following Polachek and Seiglie (2006) for example.  
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Figure 5: Dyadic democracy scores for Pakistan and India 
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As hypothesized above, conflict between two nations may abate 
with economic growth as states approach higher average income 
levels, or if they divert funds from the military towards social 
development. Here we take the mean average of India and 
Pakistan’s real GDP per capita growth rates and the mean average 
of India and Pakistan’s education expenditures as a proportion of 
respective GDPs as dyadic proxies for economic and social 
development respectively.10 We constructed the series for both 
countries by dividing GDP at constant prices taken from economic 
surveys, and dividing it by population levels. The data was later 
tallied with GDP per capita series available at World Development 
Indicators (2006) version. India and Pakistan are one of the most 
highly populated countries in the world. Pakistan has 160 million 
inhabitants, and India has over a billion citizens. In line with the 
earlier literature, we also take mean average of both countries 
populations as a standardising variable in our analysis (i.e. see 
Polachek, 1997).  
We can now proceed to VAR analysis as our empirical methodology. 
Our reduced form VAR model for conflict is as follows 
tttititititititititititt PDemoGEMilTrConfConf Ε++++++++= −−−−−−−−−− 87,6,5,4,3,21 αααααααα  
(1) 
Where 
tConf , itTr − , itMil − , itE − , itG − , tDemo and tP depict inter-state 
conflict, bilateral or multilateral trade, military burden, education 
expenditure, real growth rate of GDP per capita, dyadic democracy 
score and population, t ranges from 1950-2005 and pi ,....,1= . 
Here p is the optimal lag structure for the VAR model. 
it−,2α it−,3α it−,4α it−,5α and it−,6α are )66( × metrics (for every pi ,....,1= ). 
                                                 
10 There is insufficient time series data for public health spending data for India.  
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The model above is primarily run for the number of fatalities, Fatal 
under multiple specifications of bilateral and multilateral trade and 
the military burden to see how trade between Pakistan and India, 
their integration levels with the outside world and their military 
expenditures have determined the severity of their disputes over 
time. We have also constructed 5 additional proxies of conflict from 
COW and PRIO data sets: Volfatal, Cnfpi, Dur, Hstlvl and Hiact. All 
of them capture severity and intensity of the conflict under different 
definitions. Through out the analysis, mean averages of India and 
Pakistan’s education expenditures (Edupi), real GDP per-capita 
growth rates (Gpi), population size (Poppi) and combined 
democracy scores (Demopi) remain common regressors.  
Table 2 provides the summary of results for multiple granger 
causality tests under different specifications of equation 1. For 
example the results show that Xmpi, Xmip, and Xpi significantly 
cause Fatal and the nature of relationship is negative. This means 
that international integration is of prime importance for the success 
of peace talks between two nations. Since table 2 also shows that 
Mpi is insignificantly related with Fatal, we can conclude that export 
capabilities of both countries to outside world are more important 
for conflict mitigation than imports. This makes sense especially in 
case of India where the export capabilities are highly correlated with 
its economic growth where as in a wider context high growth rates 
of India and Pakistan have been one of the prominent motivators of 
peace talks through the sample period of 55 years.  
Furthermore, trade between India and Pakistan is also important for 
improving relationships. However as the early graphical analysis 
show, imports from India have become more significant than 
exports to India, which means that more trade with India would 
lead to increase in dependency of Pakistani markets on Indian 
exports. This is an important finding in light of the results on the 
proxies of military burden. It appears that Pakistan’s military 
expenditure is more prominently associated with India-Pakistan 
conflict than Indian military expenditure. Any worsening situation of 
the Eastern borders lead to a positive shock in Pakistan’s military 
burden. Since the hostilities between both countries have only 
fluctuated in its level of severity but continued for last 55 years 
since independence from the British in 1947, constant rise in 
military burden in Pakistani case is highly correlated with the 
conflict between two nations.  Thus it is in Pakistan’s prime interest 
to decrease hostilities with the neighbor in order to curtail military 
expenditures to some optimal levels and more resources can be 
channeled to development sector. One economic route, in order to 
create such favorable circumstances, is to open Pakistani markets to 
cheaper Indian imports which would increase the economic 
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dependency between two nations and opportunity costs of hostilities 
for both countries would rise.  
We modify our equation 1, and assume democracy to be 
endogenous to the system to carry out granger causality tests on 
Demopi to test the cause and effect of combined democratic score 
of Pakistan and India on conflict. We find that democracy or political 
orientation does not matter much in decreasing hostilities between 
two nations. Thus the case for peace between two nations is more 
economic in nature than political. Since in all cases Demopi does not 
cause conflict when ever it is endogenous to the system, we don’t 
provide a separate table of results.  
 
4 Conclusions 
We find that more trade between India and Pakistan decreases 
conflict. We can make these inferences because we utilize 
techniques of time series econometrics that can investigate 
causation and also correct for the reverse causality that bedevils the 
relation between trade and conflict. For example, increased trade 
will reduce conflict, but reduced conflict could also facilitate more 
trade between two countries. Our methodology allows us to avoid 
these problems by employing causality tests upon time series data. 
The chain of causation is from increased trade to conflict reduction, 
and not the other way around, albeit with a time lag. Greater Indian 
access to Pakistani markets will help decrease hostilities between 
the two countries. A regional trade agreement along the lines of a 
South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) could enable freer 
access to the markets of member countries, and has a high 
potential for the improvement of relations between India and 
Pakistan on long term basis. Pakistan and India’s degree of 
openness to world trade is the dominant economic factor in conflict 
resolution. One would imagine that in the counterfactual case of 
significant mutual inward investment, that too would also decrease 
mutual belligerent tendencies. 
Our results seem to suggest that Pakistan’s relative military 
expenditure is positively related with conflict, whereas Indian 
relative military expenditure has a deterrent effect on conflict (see 
table 2). This result, however, needs to be interpreted with caution. 
It does not necessarily mean that Pakistan is the principal actor 
initiating inter-state conflict with India. Rather it means that India, 
the region’s hegemonic power, has other domestic and international 
concerns to which its defense spending is targeted, besides its 
disputes with Pakistan. India, for example, has unilaterally massed 
troops on Pakistan’s borders in 1951 and 2002. Pakistan is making 
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unilateral concessions in connection with its disputes with India. 
However overall, military expenditures are still at high levels in both 
countries and are diverting scarce resources away from social 
development spending, such as on education, and poverty 
reduction. Education spending has been shown to be good for both 
peace and economic progress.  
In an ideal world increased dyadic democracy between pairs of 
nation should reduce inter-state hostility according to the 
democratic peace hypothesis; this relationship in our case is present 
but weak. Peace initiatives, it should be remembered, are not the 
sole prerogative of democracies; they can also be made by 
countries which are less than perfectly democratic out of economic 
self-interest. Perhaps, as pointed out by Franceschet (2000), the 
true notion of democratic peace rests with a view of cosmopolitan 
democracy embracing citizens rather than nations, and the Kantian 
categorical (moral) imperative to secure the inner dignity (rights) of 
every individual human being as the ultimate end. This achievable 
utopia is only likely to emerge at higher levels of economic 
development. 
Our findings, however, veer towards the liberal peace hypothesis. 
Economic progress and poverty reduction combined with greater 
openness to international trade in general are more significant 
drivers of peace between nations like India and Pakistan, rather 
than the independent contribution of a common democratic polity. 
So it is more economic interdependence rather than politics which is 
likely to contribute towards peaceful relations between India and 
Pakistan in the near future. In many ways, our results for an 
individual dyad echo Polcahek’s (1997) work across several dyads, 
where it is argued that democracies cooperate not because they 
have common political systems, but because their economies are 
intricately and intensively interdependent. As pointed by Hegre 
(2000), it is at these higher stages of economic development that 
the contribution of common democratic values to peace becomes 
more salient. Meaningful democracy cannot truly function where 
poverty is acute and endemic, even in ostensible democracies such 
as India. In the final analysis, it may be that democracy itself is an 
endogenous by-product of increased general prosperity, as 
suggested nearly half a century ago by Lipset (1960).  
In the context of the findings, one can say that current government 
of Pakistan has rightly taken the initiative to bring India back to the 
negotiation table for settlements of bilateral issues like Kashmir 
dispute which is much of a cause for tensions between the two 
nations. The acceptance of Pakistani part of Kashmir as a disputed 
territory by the Pakistani side indicates a major diplomatic shift and 
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provides a significant space for dialogue for a solution which would 
then be mutually acceptable for both sides. Furthermore, as a two 
prong strategy towards peace, the government of Pakistan has 
combined dispute settlement initiatives with increased trade 
incentives for India, as Pakistan has announced a further 5% 
decrease in tariffs on 1077 Indian products by the beginning of 
2007.  
Finally, this paper has made a significant policy contribution 
regarding India-Pakistan peace process. India being a new 
economic power house and Pakistan with an emerging economy 
should mean that Indo-Pak conflict has strong economic 
implications for both countries as well as the region itself, may be 
unlike any inter state conflict in the world. Since both countries also 
have a potential to be serious drivers of regional prosperity, it may 
also be noted that peace talks and solution of bilateral issues 
between both nations may eventually bring political and economic 
stability to the larger South Asia, which has long been trapped into 
the shackles of poverty, through initiatives like SAFTA. 
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Table 2. Multiple Granger Causality Wald Tests Based on VAR 
Direction of 
Causality  
Cause 
And 
effect 
RC Direction of 
Causality 
Cause 
And  
Effect 
RC 
FatalTpitp →  (-)* × CnfpiMilbrd →5  × × 
FatalTpiti →  (-)*** × CnfpiEdupi →  (-)* × 
FatalXmpi →  (-)** × CnfpiGpi →  (-)* × 
FatalXmip →  (-)* × DurXpi →  (-)* × 
FatalXpi →  (-)* × DurMilbrd →1  × × 
FatalMpi →   × × DurMilbrd →2  (-)** × 
FatalMilbrd →1  (+)** × DurMilbrd →5  × × 
FatalMilbrd →2  (-)** √ DurEdupi →  (-)* √ 
FatalMilbrd →3  (+)* × DurGpi →  × × 
FatalMilbrd →4  (-)* × HstlvlXpi →  (-)* × 
FatalMilbrd →5  × × HstlvlMilbrd →1  (+)* × 
FatalEdupi →  (-)** √ HstlvlMilbrd →2  (-)* × 
FatalGpi →  (-)* × HstlvlMilbrd →5  × × 
VolfatalXpi →  (-)*** × HstlvlEdupi →  (-)* × 
VolfatalMilbrd →1  (+)* × HstlvlGpi →  (-)*** × 
VolfatalMilbrd →2  (-)* × HiactXpi →  (-)*** × 
VolfatalMilbrd →5  × × HiactMilbrd →1  (+)*** × 
VolfatalEdupi →  × × HiactMilbrd →2  (-)*** × 
VolfatalGpi →  (-)*** × HiactMilbrd →5  × × 
CnfpiXpi →  (-)* × HiactEdupi →  (-)* × 
CnfpiMilbrd →1  (+)* × HiactGpi →  (-)*** × 
CnfpiMilbrd →2  (-)* ×    
*, **, *** shows significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, RC 
stands for reverse causation, √ means causes and × means does 
not cause, + or – in parenthesis implicitly means causes and 
shows the nature of relationship among two variables.  
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DATA and SOURCES  
 
Cnfpi: Intensity of Conflict between Pakistan and India, Scores 1 (Minor) when 25 
to 999 battle-related deaths and 2 (War) when at least 1000 battle-related 
deaths in a given year, Years: 1950-2003, UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Data set 
Version IV. 
 
Edupi: Average of Pakistan’s education expenditure over GDP plus India’s 
education expenditure over GDP, Years: 1950 to 2005, Sources: National Surveys 
and World bank 
 
Demopi: Pakistan and India’s combine democracy score (by adding 10 to India 
and Pakistan’s Polity2 values for each year and then taking the product of these 
values in order to covert the variable in dyadic form). 
 
Durpi: Number of days a conflict lasts in a year between Pakistan and India, 
Years: 1950-2003, Source: COW Inter-State War Data, Version 3.02, Faten et al 
(2004) 
 
Fatal: Annual fatality level of conflict between Pakistan and India, scores from 0 
to 6 
0 None 
1 1-25 Deaths 
2 26-100 Deaths 
3 101-250 Deaths 
4 251-500 Deaths 
5 501-999 Deaths 
6>999 Deaths 
Gpi: Mean average of real GDP per capita growth rates for Pakistan and India, 
Years: 1950 to 2005, Sources: Economic Surveys and World Bank.   
 
Hiact: Highest action by Pakistan and India in annual corresponding dispute 
[bracketed numbers refer to corresponding hostility level] 
0    No militarised action [1] 
1    Threat to use force   [2] 
2    Threat to blockade 
3    Threat to occupy territory [2] 
4    Threat to declare war [2] 
5    Threat to use CBR weapons  [2] 
6    Threat to join war 
7    Show of force  [3] 
8     Alert  [3] 
9     Nuclear alert   [3] 
10   Mobilisation   [3] 
11   Fortify border   [3] 
12   Border violation   [3] 
13   Blockade     [4] 
14   Occupation of territory    [4] 
15   Seizure    [4] 
16   Attack     [4] 
17   Clash       [4] 
18   Declaration of war    [4] 
19   Use of CBR weapons  [5] 
20   Begin inter-state war   [5] 
21   Join inter-state war    [5] 
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Years: 1950-2003, Source: COW Inter-State War Data, Version 3.02, Faten et al 
(2004) 
 
Hstlev:   Annual hostility levels reached by India and Pakistan in each annual 
corresponding dispute 
1 No militarised action 
2 Threat to use force 
3 Display of force 
4 Use of force 
5 War 
Years: 1950-2003, Source: COW Inter-State War Data, Version 3.02, Faten et al 
(2004) 
 
Mpi: Pakistan’s total imports plus India’s total imports as a ratio of Pakistan’s 
total GDP and India’s total GDP, Years: 1950-2005, Source: International 
Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF) 
 
Milbrd1:  Pakistan’s defence expenditure over GDP as a ratio of India’s defence 
expenditure over GDP, Years: 1950-2005, Sources: Correlates of war data set 
version 3.02, World Development Indicators 2006 (World Bank), Government 
Finance Statistics Year Book (IMF) and Economic Survey of Pakistan  
 
Milbrd2: India’s defence expenditure over GDP as a ratio of Pakistan’s defence 
expenditure over GDP. 
 
Milbrd 3: Pakistan’s defence expenditure over GDP as a ratio of Pakistan’s defence 
expenditure over GDP plus India’s defence expenditure over GDP.  
 
Milbrd 4: India’s defence expenditure over GDP as a ratio of Pakistan’s defence 
expenditure over GDP plus India’s defence expenditure over GDP.  
 
Milbrd5: Average of India’s defence expenditure over GDP and Pakistan’s defence 
expenditure over GDP, Years: 1950-2005, Sources: Correlates of war data set 
version 3.02, World Development Indicators 2006 (World Bank). 
 
Milppi: Pakistan military personnel over Pakistan’s total population as a ratio 
of India’s military personnel over India’s total population, Years: 1950-2001, 
Sources: Correlates of war data set version 3.02 and International Financial 
Statistics 2006 (IMF) 
 
Milpip:   India’s military personnel over India’s total population as a ratio of 
Pakistan’s military personnel over Pakistan’s total population. Sources: 
Correlates of war data set version 3.02 and International Financial Statistics 
2006 (IMF) 
 
 
Poppi: Average of Pakistan’s total population and India’s total population, Years: 
1950-2001, Source: International Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF) 
 
Xmpi: Pakistan’s total trade (exports + imports) as a ratio of India’s Total trade 
(exports + imports), Years: 1950-2001, Source: International Financial Statistics 
2006 (IMF) 
  
Xmip: India’s total trade (exports + imports) as a ratio of Pakistan’s total trade 
(exports + imports). Years: 1950-2005, Source: International Financial Statistics 
2006 (IMF) 
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Xpi: Pakistan’s total exports plus India’s total exports as a ratio of Pakistan’s total 
GDP plus India’s total GDP. Years: 1950-2005, Source: International Financial 
Statistics 2006 (IMF) 
 
 
Tpitp: Trade between Pakistan and India as a percentage of Pakistan’s total 
Trade, Years: 1950-2005, Sources: Direction of Trade, Statistics Yearbook, (IMF) 
 
Tpiti: Trade between Pakistan and India as a percentage of India’s total trade, 
Years: 1950-2005, Sources: Direction of Trade, Statistics Yearbook, (IMF) 
 
VolFatal: Precise volume of fatality in each annual corresponding dispute, Years: 
1950-2003, Sources:  COW Inter-State War Data, Version 3.02  (Faten et al, 
2004),  CSCW/PRIO Battle Deaths data, CSP Data set on Major Episodes of 
Political Violence 1946-2006 http://members.aol.com/cspmgm/warlist.htm. 
 
